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The presidential election of 1860 is one of the most studied in United States history. Four 
candidates contested the presidential race that saw the Democratic Party split in two and the 
Republican Party gain the presidency without a single southern electoral vote. The election 
precipitated the Civil War as the victory of Abraham Lincoln and the Republicans led to the 
secession of southern states from the Union. A wealth of historians have focused on the role of 
Lincoln and the rise of the Republican Party in the election. Many have also examined the 
Democratic split as northern Democrats backed Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas and southern 
Democrats gave their support to Vice President John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky. However, 
relatively few historians have made Tennessee Senator and Constitutional Union presidential 
candidate John Bell the focus of their work, despite the fact that he received 39 electoral votes 
and carried Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, all located within the key border region between 
the North and Deep South.  
Bell failed to secure the national support necessary to become president of the United 
States. However, his pluralities in three key states and strong showings in the Upper 
South/Border States of Maryland, Missouri, and North Carolina merit further study. Bell’s 
electoral success in Kentucky may be attributed to three key factors. First, as the Constitutional 
Union candidate, Bell received the support of influential former Whig Party politicians from 
Kentucky such as Senator John J. Crittenden, former Congressman Garret Davis, and former 
Governor Charles S. Morehead. Bell gained the loyalty of former Whig voters in Kentucky 
which had been a stronghold of the party and home to its greatest leader, Henry Clay. The Whig 
tradition in Kentucky gave Bell a firm support system in the state. Second, Bell enjoyed the 
advantage of a divided Democratic Party. Though John C. Breckenridge had the support of a 
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majority of Kentucky Democrats, Stephen Douglas peeled away a crucial twenty-five thousand 
Democratic votes to open the door for Bell’s victory. The divided Kentucky Democracy 
significantly weakened Bell’s opposition. Finally, the Constitutional Union Party of Kentucky 
ran a successful campaign with an appealing message to Kentucky voters. The Constitutional 
Union rhetoric in the state emphasized popular pro-Union and proslavery positions successfully. 
This pro-Union and proslavery message earned the trust and support of Kentucky voters, 
ultimately granting Bell an electoral victory in the state. A unique political situation existed in 
each border state, but these three factors to Bell’s success, though varying in importance, played 
a role throughout the states where Bell had significant electoral support. 
Historiography 
Historians have usually viewed the Constitutional Union Party in the 1860 election through the 
lens of another candidate. For example, Daniel Egerton’s Year of Meteors focuses primarily on 
the Lincoln and Douglas campaigns.1 His chapter dealing with the Constitutional Union Party 
also discusses the abolitionist Liberty Party which received only a smattering of voters and 
proved largely irrelevant. Allan Nevins’s multi-volume work, The Emergence of Lincoln 
likewise deals with the Constitutional Union Party primarily in a single section. 2 In contrast, the 
Constitutional Union has been the focal point of some scholarship. For example, John V. 
Mering’s article, “The Slave State Constitutional Unionists and the Politics of Consensus,” in 







South.3 This paper views the election of 1860 in Kentucky through the lens of the Constitutional 
Union Party, thereby filling in a gap in the historiography by granting the party the main focus. 
 Much scholarship on the 1860 election minimizes the appeal of Bell’s candidacy and the 
Constitutional Union platform. Bell’s biographer, Joseph Howard Parks, deems Bell an 
unexciting candidate and perhaps an unwise choice.4 Albert D. Kirwan, the biographer of 
Crittenden, describes Bell as “overweight, not very exciting, and lacking popular support.”5 Most 
historians have labeled Bell an outdated statesman leading an outdated party. They, like many 
contemporary politicians, have deemed the Constitutional Union platform as useless because it 
said nothing, remaining opportunistically silent on the issue of slavery, the primary political 
issue of the day. For example, historian E.D. Fite, in The Election of 1860, described the 
Constitutional Union platform as “two-faced” and Bell as falling on every side of the slavery 
issue.6 However, Bell proved a fitting choice as the candidate for the Constitutional Union as 
their composition and goals called for an elder statesman from the conservative Whig tradition. 
Moreover, Bell had the ability to gain the support of voters, especially in Border States such as 
Kentucky. The Constitutional Union platform, rather than deliberately two-faced, sought to take 
slavery out of the national discussion which, in itself, constituted a policy outcome and plan. The 
Constitutional Union in Kentucky embraced a clear message of protection of the institution of 
slavery, and Bell’s record on slavery was conservative, pragmatic, and protectionist. 
 Historians who study antebellum politics prior to the Civil War have documented the 









Election of 1860 Reconsidered), Daniel Egerton, and John Ashworth have all viewed the 
Constitutional Union as the inheritor of the Whig mantle and a revival of traditional Whig 
politics.7 The support of former Whigs gave Bell a ready base of political support in Kentucky 
and served as his first step to victory in the state in 1860. Many good histories of the Whig Party 
including Michael F. Holt’s Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party and Arthur Charles Cole’s 
Whig Party in the South, track the movement of former Whigs in the 1850s into the American 
Party, then the Opposition, and later to the Constitutional Union.8 
 The election of 1860 in Kentucky has been studied in several different works. In The 
Slave States in the Presidential Election of 1860, Ollinger Crenshaw provided a survey of the 
election in Kentucky. He discussed the diversity of opinion in the commonwealth, the 
importance of pro-Union politics in the election, and the benefits Bell received from the Douglas 
campaign. As part of a larger work, he does not delve into extensive detail about all facets of the 
election, but he covered most of the highpoints including the interesting fight over Henry Clay’s 
legacy.9 In his Ph.D. dissertation, “Kentucky Will Be the Last to give up the Union,” Christopher 
Paine treats the politics of the late 1850s in a chapter. Paine correctly demonstrates the 
continuing importance of the Whig legacy in Kentucky along with prominent politicians like 
Crittenden. Paine uses the election to demonstrate Kentucky’s persistent attachment to the 












in Kentucky indicates the importance of Union issues in Kentucky in 1860.10 But both Crenshaw 
and Paine fail to place enough emphasis on the decidedly proslavery tone of both the Bell and 
Breckenridge campaigns in Kentucky. While they correctly link the interests of Union and 
slavery, both fail to delve into slave politics in the election. The argument of this thesis most 
closely mirrors the work of John V. Mering on slave-state Constitutional Unionists, and it 
narrows the emphasis to a single state in order to paint a specific portrait.  
 The politics of slavery proved a key issue in the 1860 election in Kentucky, indicating the 
significance of the institution in the state. Scholars such as John W. Coleman, Marion Lucas, and 
Harold Tallant have provided useful studies of Kentucky slavery. Coleman’s Slavery Times in 
Kentucky, completed in 1940, offered an in-depth look at slavery in Kentucky including 
plantation life, the slave trade, runaways, Kentucky dissenters, and the violence that sustained 
the institution. Coleman argued that in Kentucky “the yoke of bondage rested lightly” compared 
to the slave states of the Deep South. Coleman’s portrait of Kentucky slavery as more mild than 
elsewhere in the U.S. persists to this day. Despite his dated racial language and claims for the 
relative mildness of Kentucky slavery, Coleman still occasionally recognized the “cruel and 
brutal” characteristics of the institution.11 Marion Lucas, in A History of Blacks in Kentucky, 
expands on the work of Coleman. While emphasizing the inherent force and violence behind 
slavery in Kentucky and offering a more accurate depiction than Coleman, Lucas cannot resist 









In Evil Necessity: Slavery and Political Culture in Antebellum Kentucky, Harold Tallant 
likewise differentiates Kentucky from other slave societies. Focusing on the antislavery 
sentiments expressed by prominent Kentucky politicians such as Henry Clay, the presence of a 
politically active antislavery community in Kentucky, and the relative moderation of slavery’s 
defense, he argues that Kentuckians saw slavery as a “necessary evil” rather than a positive 
good, like Deep South residents.13 James Ramage and Andrea S. Watkins’s recent study of 
antebellum Kentucky politics, Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and Culture from the Early 
Republic to the Civil War, draws on Tallant’s work to argue that Kentucky exhibited a relative 
diversity of opinion about slavery. However, the both works also note the protections afforded 
slavery by Kentucky politicians, the updated state constitutions, and increasingly stringent slave 
laws, thereby demonstrating the commitment of white Kentuckians to protect the institution.14 
Historian Lowell Harrison offered a detailed history of the antislavery movement discussed by 
Ramage and Watkins, Lucas, and Tallant in The Antislavery Movement in Kentucky.15 
 In 1860, the population of Kentucky amounted to 1,155,684 individuals, making it the 
ninth largest state in the Union and the third largest slave state.16 Kentuckians owned 225,483 
slaves, accounting for 19 percent of the population and placing it ninth in terms of slave 
population of the fifteen slaveholding states. Nonetheless, 38,645 slave owners resided in the 
commonwealth, giving Kentucky the third largest number of owners behind only Virginia and 












institution political, economic, and social importance. In the election of 1860, voters with an 
interest in slavery sought protection for the institution. Constitutional Union Party success 
depended partially on appealing to these voters. 
 The party’s strategy in 1860 followed the long standing dynamic of slave politics in 
Kentucky. Over time, slave codes and regulations on free blacks became more stringent. In 1799, 
the Kentucky Constitution banned free blacks from owning guns and removed the right of 
suffrage from free blacks.18 When the Kentucky legislature called a convention to amend the 
state constitution in 1850, antislavery Kentuckians hoped they might increase the rights of free 
blacks and even embark on a path to gradual abolition.19 However, when white male 
Kentuckians went to the polls, they elected an overwhelmingly proslavery convention. The 1850 
Constitution represented the most comprehensive protection of slaveholders’ rights in Kentucky 
history.20 Clearly, the majority of white Kentuckians, whether or not they viewed slavery as a 
necessary evil, wanted to protect the institution.  
 According to Ramage and Watkins, white Kentuckians desired the protection of slavery 
for four reasons. First, they believed in the racial inferiority of African Americans and thought 
free blacks posed a threat to public safety through theft or violence.21 Black freedom, white 
voters concluded, would result in race war, racial mixing, and social disorder. Second, white 
Kentuckians supported the property rights of slave owners and felt loyalty to the slave South.22 
Third, agricultural slavery and the slave trade benefitted the Kentucky economy. Lexington and 









transportation of Kentucky slaves to the Deep South.23 Finally, most white Kentuckians believed 
that the Union and the Constitution, at minimum, protected the institution of slavery where it 
presently existed. 
 Despite constitutional and legal statutes protecting the institution of slavery and 
oppressing the free black population, a small yet vocal minority of Kentuckians opposed slavery 
in the commonwealth, representing the largest antislavery white population in the South.24 The 
Kentucky branch of the American Colonization Society, dedicated to the removal of blacks to 
Liberia after gradual manumission, had the third largest number of chapters of any state in the 
Union.25 More radical voices, including Whig politician Cassius Clay and minister John Fee, 
sought a more immediate end to slavery. With the help of Clay, Fee organized the “Bereans,” an 
abolitionist organization that founded a school to provide education to Kentucky’s free black 
population and used moral suasion to end slavery in Kentucky.26 Despite such voices, the 
majority of white Kentuckians supported the institution of slavery and sought its protection. As a 
result, any candidate hoping to carry the state in 1860 had to assure voters of their commitment 
to the institution.  
Chapter 1: The Backdrop of the Campaign  
The Collapse of the Whig Party and the Politics of the 1850s: 
Assessing the Constitutional Union candidacy of John Bell requires understanding the politics of 








and the dispersal of Whig voters and politicians into new political organizations. Conservative 
Whig politicians and their supporters, located primarily in the Border States, became the 
backbone of the Constitutional Union Party in 1860. After the breakup of the Whig Party, most 
future Constitutional Union supporters moved into the American Party, then formed the 
Opposition, and finally joined the Constitutional Union Party. Former Whig political leaders 
from Kentucky such as John J. Crittenden, Garrett Davis, and Charles S. Morehead, along with 
their allied newspapers and voters, supported John Bell and the Constitutional Union, giving it a 
firm electoral base in Kentucky. This base of voters, centered in greater Louisville, Lexington, 
and the inner Bluegrass region, provided Bell with the first ingredient to his success in 1860.  
The politics of compromise and national Union associated with Whig Party leaders such 
as Daniel Webster and Henry Clay had success, albeit briefly, at the beginning of the decade 
with the Compromise of 1850 that included concessions to both the North and the South on 
slavery. It granted the North the admission of California as a free state and banned the slave trade 
in Washington D.C. The compromise prevented the adoption of the Wilmot Proviso, intended to 
ban the extension of slavery to new territories, and put in place a more stringent fugitive slave 
law to appease the South. The compromise, engineered by Henry Clay but passed by breaking 
the bill into pieces by Illinois Democratic Senator Stephen A. Douglas, enjoyed the support of 
conservative Border South Whigs such as then Senator Bell and Crittenden who would become 
the future leaders of the Constitutional Union Party.27 In the election of 1860, the party’s 







 Conservative Whigs hoped that the Compromise of 1850 would ease sectional tensions 
and finally settle the slavery question. Crittenden, attorney general in Millard Fillmore’s 
administration, called the compromise “the only salvation for the Union.”29 Bell, though a 
supporter of the compromise, did not share Crittenden’s optimism. He believed that the 
compromise alone would not heal the sectional divide between the North and the South over 
slavery.30 In response to the growing sectional divide within the Whig Party, Bell and other 
conservative Whigs began to test the waters on the subject of a conservative national union 
party.31 The initial plans for such a party included the unification of moderate Whigs and 
Democrats behind a platform dedicated to supporting of the Compromise of 1850 and combating 
sectional agitation. By encouraging compromise, this party could protect both slavery and the 
Union.32 Alexander Stephens and Robert Toombs, both of Georgia, led the charge to create the 
new party. Ultimately, Bell did not sign the document circulated among national legislators in 
1850 supporting the formation of such a party because his political advisors in Tennessee 
encouraged reform of and loyalty to the existing Whig Party. This early effort to forge a national 
union party foreshadowed the creation of the Constitutional Union Party in 1860. Six United 
States congressmen from Kentucky signed the document of support along with the state’s senior 
senator and statesman, Henry Clay.33 Kentucky political leaders’ support of a national union 
party designed to calm sectional agitation and protect slavery and the union in 1850, 










 The Whig Party came out of the Compromise of 1850 intact, but with a growing divide 
between northern antislavery and southern proslavery Whigs. Before the Whig nominating 
convention of 1852, southern Whigs supported President Millard Fillmore and the Compromise 
of 1850. In contrast, northern Whigs thought Fillmore and the 1850 Compromise too pro-
southern. The two sides agreed on General Winfield Scott of Mexican War fame as a 
compromise candidate.34 William A. Graham, a former senator and governor of North Carolina, 
ran as Scott’s vice president. Graham would strongly support the Constitutional Union Party in 
1860. In the election of 1852, the Democratic candidate, Franklin Pierce, won in an electoral 
college landslide, defeating Scott and the Whigs by 254 to 42.35 The Whig Party failed to run 
another presidential candidate after 1852, but Scott and the Whigs carried the Border South 
strongholds of Kentucky and Tennessee in their party’s last election. John Bell and the 
Constitutional Union would carry both states in 1860, demonstrating the continuity of voter 
support between the Whigs and the future Constitutional Union Party.36 In 1860, General Scott 
also gave the Constitutional Union his support.37 
 The debate over the extension of slavery triggered the collapse of the Whig Party. The 
Compromise of 1850 offered only a brief respite from sectional conflict over slavery, and the 
nail in the Whig Party coffin was the Kanas-Nebraska Act of 1854.38 The act, engineered by 
Stephen A. Douglas, established the principle of popular sovereignty for determining the 
extension of slavery into the territories. Popular sovereignty, which became synonymous with 










territory would allow or prohibit the extension of slavery. The act organized the territories of 
Kansas and Nebraska and opened them to the possibility of the extension of slavery on the basis 
of popular sovereignty. This effectively repealed Henry Clay’s hallmark achievement, the 1820 
Missouri Compromise, which admitted Missouri to the Union as a slave state, Maine as a free 
state, and banned extension of slavery north of the 36◦30’ latitude line. Kentucky Whig Senator 
Archibald Dixon authored the amendment that repealed the Missouri Compromise line.39 John 
Bell, serving in the Senate Committee on Territories, allowed the amendment to pass committee, 
but reserved (and exercised) the right to vote against the act and the amendment because he 
opposed the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.40 
 The Democratic Party, in control of Congress and with the support of the Pierce 
administration, pushed the Kansas-Nebraska Act through both the House and the Senate. Most 
southern Whigs supported the measure, believing the Missouri Compromise line unfairly limited 
the extension of slavery. Their northern counterparts, however largely opposed the extension of 
slavery, and most voted against Kansas Nebraska.41 After the vote, many southern Whigs 
renounced their party membership because of the both real and perceived antislavery sentiments 
of their northern counterparts.42 Many northern Whigs, including Abraham Lincoln, ultimately 
joined the Republican Party, while many Deep South Whigs followed men like Senator Robert 
Toombs of Georgia who had become a Democrat.43 The collapse of the Whig Party left Border 
South Whigs such as Bell and Crittenden in an awkward position, opposed to antislavery 










defunct Whig Party remained politically active and looked for new homes while retaining many 
of their key Whig principles.45 In the years to come, many conservative Whigs embraced the 
nativist Know-Nothing and its political offshoot, the American Party. They later formed the 
Constitutional Union Party. 
 Bell and Texas Senator Sam Houston gained the distinction of being the only two 
senators from slaveholding states to vote against the Kansas-Nebraska Act.46 These two men 
would became the primary candidates for the presidential nomination of the Constitutional Union 
in 1860 at its Baltimore convention. Bell’s opposition to Kansas-Nebraska came from his 
pragmatic support of the Missouri Compromise, his desire to discourage sectional agitation, and 
his opposition to further expansion into Native American territories.47 Moreover, though he 
believed Congress had the power to legislate slaveholding in the territories, he also knew that 
repealing the Missouri Compromise would cause unnecessary sectional conflict. He did not 
believe slavery could survive in the climate and soil of Kansas or Nebraska, and thus viewed the 
extension issue an unnecessary abstraction that caused pointless conflict.48 As Bell stated in the 
Senate: 
“What has the South to gain by this measure? Will slavery be established under its 
provisions? Does anyone who has fully considered the subject believe that this territory 









 Bell’s vote on the Kansas-Nebraska Act would become a topic of discussion in Kentucky 
during the 1860 campaign. On October 27, the Louisville Courier, an important Kentucky 
Breckenridge organ, highlighted Bell’s Kansas-Nebraska vote to cast doubts on his proslavery 
credentials. Referring to Bell’s vote, the Courier stated, “I do not charge Mr. Bell with being 
hostile to the institution of slavery. I simply state the facts and leave the people to judge this 
public act (vote against Kansas-Nebraska).”50 The Louisville Journal, the primary Bell organ in 
Kentucky, defended Bell’s vote and the Missouri Compromise. On May 11, 1860, the Journal 
described the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its repeal of the Missouri Compromise as “fatally 
deluded.”51 On July 25, the Journal, in the form of a letter from Kentucky politician and former 
U.S. Congressman Garrett Davis, attacked the Democrats and specifically Stephen Douglas for 
Kansas-Nebraska and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.52 The Journal unequivocally 
blamed the Democratic Party for the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the subsequent sectional strife 
and violence between pro and antislavery forces there on the Democratic Party. The Bell organ 
hammered home the position that Kansas-Nebraska caused unnecessary sectional strife and 
emphasized Bell’s proslavery pronouncements and record and his personal ownership of 
slaves.53 
 In 1854, after the collapse of the Whig Party over Kansas-Nebraska and the slavery 
question, former Whigs, both North and South, began the search for a new political entity. At the 
same time, the nativist Know-Nothing organization grew in membership and influence.54 The 









began in urban areas that had seen a large influx of Catholic immigrants, but by 1854, Know-
Nothing lodges had cropped up throughout the nation from New England to the Deep South 
states of Louisiana and Alabama.55 Though Know-Nothings numbered both Democrats and 
former Whigs among their ranks and professed to favor neither party, they generally opposed 
Democratic candidates because of the party’s aggressive pursuit of foreign voters and most often 
endorsed veteran Whig candidates56 The Know-Nothing movement thus became the home for 
conservative Whig opposition to the Democracy. Still, the new organization was not monolithic. 
Many Democrats also joined Know-Nothing lodges in 1854-55, and the society did endorse 
some Democratic candidates.57 
The Know-Nothings, a secret lodge-based society, was not a political party, but the 
organization gave rise to the American Party, which contested the 1856 elections. After the 
collapse of the Whig Party in 1854, many Kentucky Whigs initially maintained their 
independence from the growing Know-Nothing movement. They wanted to avoid the nativists’ 
anti-Catholic message, and maintain their Whig identity as the party that had produced the Great 
Compromiser Henry Clay. However, the collapse of the national party made this position 
untenable, Kentucky Whigs went over to the Know-Nothing movement in droves, believing that 
they could turn it into a national, pro-union party.58 John J. Crittenden, one of these somewhat 
reluctant Kentucky Whigs, supported the American Party, though he did not become a Know-
Nothing himself. “The great and paramount object of this party,” he stated, “should be the 









Nothingism and did not formally join the society. However, in a speech in Knoxville, he called 
on the American Party, after the demise of the Whig organization, to become a permanent 
opposition to the Democrats.60 
The Know-Nothings and Americans did not become the national union party in 
opposition to Democrats that conservative Whigs like Bell and Crittenden hoped. In the North, 
antislavery men opposed to the extension of slavery had begun to join the Know-Nothings as 
they banded together with Republicans in the North.61 As early as 1855, the Know-Nothing 
movement began to splinter as the Whigs had, and the nation would, along sectional lines. When 
the Know-Nothings convened in 1855 in Philadelphia, they adopted a resolution not to agitate 
over slavery, implicitly allowing the Kansas-Nebraska Act to stand. Though this pleased men 
like Crittenden who hoped to form a new national union party, it prompted most northern Know-
Nothings to throw their support to the Republican Party.62 The American Party ultimately 
nominated former Whig President Millard Fillmore despite discussion of the nomination going to 
Bell, Edward Everett, or Garrett Davis.63 
In 1856, a three way race between the Republican Party (in its first presidential election), 
the Democratic Party, and the American Party ended with the victory of James Buchanan, the 
Democratic candidate. Buchanan won 174 electoral votes, carrying the entire South and every 
border state except Maryland. Fillmore ran strongest in the Border South, as the Constitutional 
Union would in 1860, but carried only Maryland.64 Despite the support of conservative Border 









American Party did not win Kentucky. Fillmore lost the state by over seven thousand votes, over 
5 percent of the Kentucky popular vote, granting the Democrats their first presidential victory in 
Kentucky in over twenty years.65 Former southern Whigs saw Buchanan’s victory not as a 
solution to sectional politics, but as a holding action that only postponed the question until the 
1860 election.66 
In Kentucky, George D. Prentice, editor of the Journal, and Garrett Davis, former 
congressman and Whig political leader, led the charge for the American Party and vehemently 
fought Democratic claims that it included abolitionists.67 In 1855, Kentucky Know-Nothings 
supported Charles S. Morehead for governor, as did Davis and Crittenden. Morehead won the 
state by 4,400 votes, and six of ten Know-Nothing congressional candidates won election. Forty 
of the former Whig counties that had voted for Scott in the 1852 presidential election went for 
Know-Nothings.68 The state vote revealed the continuity between the collapsing Whig party in 
Kentucky and the American Party, the persistence of voter loyalty, and the ability of former 
Kentucky Whigs to organize effectively.  
Know-Nothingism proved controversial in Kentucky in the 1860 election. The state 
Constitutional Union attempted to claim the American Party mantle several times, and in an 
article titled, “The Fillmore Men,” the Journal claimed the support of Fillmore and the American 
Party as a national union party.69 Certainly some prominent Kentucky Know-Nothings, including 










Constitutional Unionists and Democrats attempted to distance themselves from the nativism of 
the Know-Nothings. On July 25, the Journal accused Breckenridge of nativism and Know-
Nothing membership.70 Breckenridge responded to charges of nativism in his speech near 
Ashland on September 5, 1860, claiming to have “never uttered such a sentiment.”71 The 
Courier, a Breckenridge ally, regularly applied the Know-Nothing label to Bell, referring to him 
as the “Know-Nothing Candidate for President,” and his party as the “Know-Nothing-
Opposition-Union Party,” highlighting the political path traveled by many former Whigs in these 
three successor organizations.72 
In 1856, the American Party became the temporary ally and political home of prominent 
conservative Border South Whigs such as Davis, Bell, and Crittenden. Four years later, these 
men became leaders of the Constitutional Union Party in Kentucky. When the American Party 
collapsed along sectional lines, these political actors and their voters again searched for a new 
home. In Kentucky and the Upper South, they gravitated to what became known as “The 
Opposition,” maintaining a significant political influence. But the turmoil benefited Kentucky 
Democrats who began to gain ground in Kentucky in the 1850s. In 1859, Democrat Beriah 
Magoffin defeated former Whig and Oppositionist candidate Joshua Bell by over nine thousand 
votes in the gubernatorial race, and Democrats claimed six of ten of Kentucky’s U.S. House 
seats.73 Democratic gains prompted the Kentucky Opposition to seek a new political organization 









Growing sectional turmoil over slavery in the final three years of the 1850s convinced 
former conservative Whigs of the need for a new national party. In 1857, the Buchanan 
administration and allied Democrats hoped that the Supreme Court would resolve the slavery 
issue. In Dred Scott vs. Sanford, Scott, a slave who had lived in the free states of Illinois and 
Wisconsin, sued for his freedom after the death of his master. The Supreme Court ruled that 
African Americans were not citizens and therefore Scott could not sue for freedom. The Court 
added that the federal government could not regulate slavery in the territories. The Court’s 
decision, rather than resolving the debate, sparked anger in the North among Republicans as well 
as Democrats. In contrast, southern Democrats welcomed the discussion, and in the election of 
1860 in Kentucky, Breckenridge campaigned on the support of Dred Scott and claimed his 
position on the expansion of slavery constitutionally supported by the highest court in the 
nation.74 
The sectional situation became more dire when Kansas applied for statehood under the 
proslavery Lecompton Constitution. Though it represented the opinion of only proslavery 
Kansans, the constitution received the endorsement of the Buchanan administration and southern 
Democrats. But a coalition of congressional Republicans and northern Democrats, led by 
Stephen Douglas, denied Kansas’s application for statehood under Lecompton. Bell, Crittenden, 
and many former southern Whigs who became Constitutional Unionists joined the northern 
representatives in voting against Lecompton.75 The failure of the proslavery constitution further 






1860, Kentucky Democrats charged Bell and the Constitutional Unionists with abandoning the 
interests of slavery and the South with their votes against Lecompton.  
The escalating battle over slavery culminated in violence. On October 16, 1859, John 
Brown, a radical abolitionist who had massacred proslavery men at Pottowatamie, Kansas, in 
1856, led a raid on the federal armory at Harpers Ferry, Virginia. Brown intended to raid the 
armory, arm local slaves, and incite a slave rebellion in the South. The plan failed, and the state 
of Virginia executed Brown for treason, inciting a slave insurrection, and murder.76 Harpers 
Ferry confirmed southerners’ fears of northern antislavery aggression. Border State 
Oppositionists, former Whigs, and future Constitutional Unionists loudly condemned Brown, 
antislavery men, and northern radicals.77 Brown’s raid ruined hopes of men like Crittenden who 
hoped to fuse with conservative Republicans in a new national party. 
Without significant northern support, the Border State “Opposition” supplied most of the 
political leaders and voters of the Constitutional Union Party in 1860. In Kentucky, the party’s 
supporters were mainly former Whigs who had moved into the ranks of the American Party after 
the Whig collapse and then to the Opposition. Support of men such as Davis, Charles Morehead, 
and Crittenden who had traveled this path in the 1850s ensured credibility in the state. These 
former Whigs brought Bell the backing of organs such as the Kentucky Whig and the Louisville 
Journal, along with voter support in former Whig strongholds such as the inner Bluegrass 
(Lexington), Louisville, and the western coalfields (Owensboro and Henderson). This crucial 







correspondent predicting the result of the election in Kentucky wrote, “Mr. Bell will carry the 
state by several thousand plurality, and I hope all the Whigs will stand by him.”78 
The Rise of the Constitutional Union Party 
In 1860, in response to a decade of tumult and increasing sectional conflict over slavery, old 
conservative Whigs organized a new national party. The party attracted respected politicians 
such as John Bell, John J. Crittenden, Edward Everett of Massachusetts, John P. Kennedy of 
Maryland, William Graham of North Carolina, and William Rives of Virginia who had long 
careers in the Senate, presidential administrations, and state governors’ offices.79 These men had 
considered joining a national union party in 1850, witnessed the collapse of their Whig Party in 
1854, and placed their hopes on the American Party in 1856. They resisted joining their old 
rivals, the Democrats, and their new foes, the northern sectional Republican Party. They sought a 
new organization to contest what many considered the most important presidential election in 
history. As Leslie Combs, former Kentucky Whig Congressman wrote, “May God save the 
country and our liberties and damn all who lack Unionism.”80 
 The idea of a national union party had been discussed in 1850, and men such as 
Crittenden and Bell had hoped the American Party would fit this description in 1856. This vision 
would be realized in the Constitutional Union Party in 1860. In 1859, Nathan Sargent, a Whig 
political strategist, publisher, and newspaper editor from New York began to organize a national 








conservative Republicans who had once belonged to the Whig Party.81 The same year, 
Crittenden worked within Congress to organize a national union party from the top down. He 
hoped to gain the support of former Whigs looking for a new party, conservative Republicans, 
and some moderate Democrats.82 Crittenden thought he could win over many moderate Whigs-
turned-Republicans who had pledged their support to the new party because of its stances on 
issues like the tariff. In early 1859, Prentice and Crittenden both thought it possible that 
Republicans might abandon their ardent antislavery views and fuse with them to win the 
election.83 However, John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry in October, and continued antislavery 
agitation made fusion with the Republicans impossible for the Border State Oppositionists. 
Republicans also sensed that they might win outright and thus would not temper their antislavery 
views to effect a national fusion.84 
 Despite this setback, Constitutional Union leaders continued to organize. On May 9-10, 
1860, the party held a national convention in Baltimore and nominated the first presidential 
candidate of the election. The convention formally represented both the American Party and the 
Whig Party.85 This convention constituted “the closest thing to a resurrected Whig Party that was 
imaginable in the final months of the Antebellum Republic.”86 Crittenden, the party organizer, 
served as the keynote speaker. He wanted the party to “serve the interests of the whole 
country…combat sectional animosity…and [unite] the conservative men of the country.”87  The 











president. Hunt urged the delegates to “know no Party but our Country and no platform but the 
Union.”88 
 As at most antebellum political conventions, delegates put forward a variety of 
candidates for president including notable men such as Graham of North Carolina, Everett of 
Massachusetts, and Edward Bates of Missouri. Ultimately, only three men proved serious 
contenders: Bell, Houston, and Crittenden. The nomination was Crittenden’s for the taking, but 
he let delegates know before the convention that he did not wish to be considered due to his 
age.89 With Crittenden bowing out, the nomination came down to Bell or Houston. Crittenden 
opposed the nomination of Houston because of the latter’s long friendship with Andrew Jackson 
and his Democratic career.90Having the party leader Crittenden on his side greatly aided Bell’s 
cause.  
 Nonetheless, Bell’s nomination was not a foregone conclusion. Seeking to be the 
people’s candidate, Houston had started a grassroots movement and hoped to have the support of 
New York, Alabama, Georgia, and possibly Kentucky (pending Crittenden’s decision to decline) 
heading into the convention.91 The Journal praised Houston as a “true champion of the 
Constitution and the Union.”92 Houston also offered the allure of popularity. Writing to relatives 
in Kentucky from Madisonville, Texas, one (future) Breckenridge supporter wrote that “If old 
Sam Houston would be a candidate…he will likely carry Texas, at least I am afraid so.”93 











of their own. On the first ballot, Bell received 68 and a half votes, Houston 57, Crittenden 
(despite his protest) 28 (including the Kentucky delegation), and Everett 25.94 Tennessee, 
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Delaware backed Bell. On the second ballot, Virginia 
delegates marshalled support for Bell as a trustworthy, conservative Whig, Crittenden delivered 
the Kentucky delegates, and Bell won the nomination 138 to 69 over Houston.95 
 To balance the ticket and give it a national character, the party nominated Everett for vice 
president. A conservative Whig in the same vein as Henry Clay, Everett served as governor of 
Massachusetts, a United States Senator, and the secretary of state under Fillmore.96 Despite some 
misgivings, Everett accepted the nomination, writing to Convention President Washington Hunt 
that he hoped to fight the “sectional characteristics of a fearful struggle between the North and 
South.”97 
The primary Whig-American-Oppositionist, now Constitutional Union organ in 
Kentucky, the Louisville Journal, wholeheartedly unfurled the Bell-Everett banner in its pages. 
On May 12, it proclaimed, “We ratify this nomination with our whole heart. John Bell is worthy 
to be President of the United States…he will be a pure and honest man, is a statesmen of 
experience and of tried tenacity and a patriot of unspotted loyalty.”98 Two days later the paper 
exclaimed, “I think I speak for the voice of Kentucky when I say that John Bell claims her 
devoted respect next to John J. Crittenden.”99 Former Kentucky Whigs, political leaders, and 










a large and “enthusiastic” ratification meeting to celebrate the Bell-Everett ticket and officially 
kick off the campaign in early July.100 
 Many historians, including Bell’s own biographer, have viewed the selection of Bell as at 
best unexciting and at worst unwise for the Constitutional Union. Historian Joseph Howard Parks 
calls Bell “much admired and respected but little loved.”101 But the Constitutional Union Party’s 
desire to calm sectional tensions and bridge the divide over slavery required a man of Bell’s 
experience and proven statesmanship. Sixty-four at the time of the election, Bell’s age 
highlighted the Constitutional Union Party’s strength of seasoned experience and statesmanship. 
Bell had served as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1834-35, as Secretary of 
War, and as a U.S. Senator for more than a decade from 1847-1859.102 He participated in the 
great congressional debates of the 1850s, including the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, and the Lecompton Constitution. Each time, Bell voted with the interest of 
national union at heart. Many voters may have viewed Bell as an old statesmen lacking 
consistent principles with regard to slavery, but a large plurality of Kentuckians put their faith in 
Bell’s proven record, experience, and national rather than sectional voting record. 
Despite historians’ assertions, Bell’s campaign generated notable excitement. Just as the 
Lincoln campaign inspired young “wide-awake” demonstrators, Bell’s young supporters were 
known as the “Bell Ringers” after the practice became popular at Constitutional Union campaign 
rallies.103 Women too supported the Bell-Everett campaign in large numbers, carrying on a Whig 








campaign received more female support than any other candidate in 1860.104 Joseph F. Scott, 
writing from Harrison County, Kentucky, described Bell men as more optimistic and excited 
compared to Breckenridge supporters in the commonwealth. “The Breckenridge men,” Scott 
wrote, “seem to be rather down in the mouth while the Bell men are reverse.”105 If Bell proved, 
victorious, Scott planned to purchase a bust of the Tennessee senator.106 Writing to Kentucky 
from Massachusetts, Leverett Saltonstall described the Constitutional Union Party in his state as 
“rapidly gaining ground [and] full of enthusiasm.”107 Evidence from the Journal and Kentucky 
correspondents reveals that Bell generated support and even excitement among voters in the 
Commonwealth.  
With sectional conflict looming, the Constitutional Union Party did not adopt a 
traditional party platform at its convention. Disavowing parties as “sectional,” the party 
recognized “no political principle other than the Constitution of the Country, the Union of the 
States, and the Enforcement of the Laws.”108 In a statement released shortly after the convention, 
the party accused the Democrats and Republicans of using slavery as a political tool to gain 
power at the expense of national unity. To preserve the nation, they advocated “removing the 
subject of slavery from national politics and leaving it to the control of states in which it 
exists.”109 The party thus refused to take a stance on the primary issue of the day to facilitate 
compromise and national unity. Party leaders also declined to weigh in on other partisan issues 












protective tariff plank, the convention decided to put aside all partisan issues and make national 
unity its priority.110 The platform’s ambiguity became a key point of political debate during the 
1860 campaign nation.  
 The composition, platform, and candidate of the Constitutional Union Party ensured the 
electoral support of many Kentuckians in the election of 1860. The Constitutional Union Party’s 
leaders were the sort of Border State Whigs that Kentuckians had long supported. The party, as 
the political inheritor of the conservative Whiggery of Henry Clay, found a ready voter base in 
Kentucky, long a Whig stronghold. Kentucky had voted for Whig presidential candidates in 
every election between 1832 and 1852, and the state gave Bell their support in 1860 as he took 
back up the Whig mantle. Bell represented the Border South Whig tradition that had strong 
popular support in Kentucky. The election of 1860 centered on the issues of national union and 
slavery. The voters of Kentucky opted for experienced statesmanship, compromise, union, and 
the protection of slavery. 
The Challengers 
The election of 1860 featured three primary candidates in addition to Bell. The Democratic Party 
split along sectional lines and nominated two candidates, Vice President John C. Breckenridge of 
Kentucky became the southern nominee and Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas was the 
northern candidate. The Republican Party chose former Illinois Congressman Abraham Lincoln, 
and it conducted its campaign almost entirely in the North. Two minor candidates also ran in the 
election. Denied the Constitutional Union nomination, Sam Houston received the nomination of 





election, but Gerrit Smith, a John Brown supporter and former congressman of New York, only 
received a smattering of votes nationally. In Kentucky, the race centered on Breckenridge and 
Bell, but Douglas received roughly twenty-five thousand votes, damaging the Breckenridge 
campaign and opening the door to a Bell victory. The votes Douglas stripped away from 
Breckenridge due to the Democratic split were the second ingredient in Bell’s winning formula. 
 As the 1860 Democratic National Convention approached, agitation over slavery and 
inter-party strife threatened to split the party. The Dred Scott decision emboldened southern 
slavery expansionists to call for constitutional protection of slavery everywhere in the United 
States. President Buchanan, Chief Justice Taney, and southern ultras hoped that the Supreme 
Court decision would settle the slavery issue permanently in the South’s favor, and southern 
Democrats pushed for the acceptance of the proslavery Lecompton Constitution in Kansas. 
Douglas, the leader of the northern Democracy, successfully organized against the acceptance of 
Lecompton, and emboldened southern Democrats deemed him an unacceptable candidate for 
president in 1860.111 Southern ultras, touting Dred Scott, embraced a radical doctrine of slavery 
expansion just three short years after they had voted for popular sovereignty in the Kansas-
Nebraska Act. After their Supreme Court victory, they no longer accepted popular sovereignty, 
decrying it as a threat to the existence of slavery. Southern Democrats, heading into the 1860 
Charleston National Convention, would not accept Stephen Douglas or the popular sovereignty 
pronouncements embodied in his Freeport Doctrine which stated that citizens of a territory may 






 From April 23 to May 3, 1860, Democrats met in Charleston, South Carolina, to 
nominate their presidential candidate and write a platform. The convention was doomed to 
failure when most southern Democrats, led by Alabama fire-eater William Lowndes Yancy, 
refused any concessions to northern Democrats.113 Antiquated convention rules did not help the 
cause of reconciliation. Two-thirds of the delegate present had to support the candidate who won 
the nomination. Delegates were apportioned by electoral college vote, giving the weaker, 
northern wing of the party a disproportionate amount of power, while the platform and resolution 
committee better reflected the power of the South.114 The over-representation of the North gave 
Douglas a fair chance to win the nomination, but the resolution committee rules ensured that the 
majority platform proposal reflected southern interests.115 Either the northern Democrats had to 
yield on Douglas or give the South their platform. 
The first battle erupted over the platform. The committee split across sectional lines and 
could not reach a consensus. Northern Democrats issued a minority platform that echoed the 
1856 statement and left room for popular sovereignty and Douglas’s Freeport Doctrine. Southern 
Democrats published a majority platform that adopted Yancey’s southern ultra position.116 After 
long debate, the convention accepted the minority platform of the northern Democrats, and most 
southerners began to walk out.117 However, Kentucky and Tennessee delegates remained, and 
Kentuckians attempted to extend the convention in hopes of reaching a compromise.118 The 










their meeting the “seceders’ convention.”119 The paper gladly pronounced the end of their 
Democratic foe: “Funeral Notice: It is with great pain that we record the death of the Democratic 
Party.”120 
 Even after the southern walk out, a compromise at Charleston remained possible. 
Kentuckian James Guthrie, secretary of the treasury in the Pierce administration, emerged as a 
dark horse candidate acceptable to Border South Democrats. Early in 1860, both Democratic 
papers in Louisville, the Courier and the Democrat, supported Guthrie for the nomination, and 
the Journal argued that if Guthrie received the Democratic nomination he would carry 
Kentucky.121 The Kentucky Whig newspaper stated that “Mr. Guthrie would be supported by the 
Whigs and Americans of the state.”122 Guthrie purportedly returned the favor by endorsing the 
Bell and Everett campaign in July.123 Guthrie had the support of moderates at the convention, but 
over fifty ballots later, no candidate could break the two-thirds threshold as Douglas men refused 
to back down to southern pressure. When southern men agreed to meet in Richmond in June, the 
remaining Democrats set a new convention date for June 18 in Baltimore. These delegates also 
decided that states should replace the seceding delegations in Baltimore.124 
 As June 18 approached, southern state parties refused to select new delegates and instead 
sent the Charleston seceders to Baltimore. Indeed, South Carolina and Florida officially declined 
to send delegates to Baltimore, instructing them to go to Richmond although many would attend 











would fall apart as a result of these delegations. The credentials committee could not decide on 
which delegates to seat. Georgia sent two delegations, other southern states had failed to appoint 
new delegates, and South Carolina and Florida had not sanctioned their delegates to attend the 
Baltimore convention. The credentials committee submitted two reports. When the northern 
Democracy’s report carried the vote, southern delegates walked out a second time.126 Kentucky 
delegates remained the rest of the day after other slaveholding states delegations had left, but the 
next day they joined their fellow slave state Democrats.127 
The second convention finalized the rift between southern and northern Democrats. At 
Baltimore, the northern Democrats quickly nominated Douglas and adopted the 1856 platform 
while southern Democrats selected Kentuckian and Vice President Breckenridge on the Yancey 
platform.128 The Kentucky delegates attempted to strike a compromise and keep the party 
together, but ultimately joined their fellow slaveholding states. The Democratic Party split 
opened the door for the Bell campaign in Kentucky. Most state Democrats embraced its favorite 
son Breckenridge, but a significant minority supported Douglas. In short, while Bell enjoyed the 
support of erstwhile Kentucky Whigs/Americans/Oppositionists, he faced a weaker opponent 
after the Democratic split. 
Northern Democrat Stephen Douglas espoused national union and compromise, but failed 
to gain traction in Kentucky despite voters’ attachment to union. Several factors undermined 
Douglas’s campaign in the state. Douglas struggled in all the slaveholding states because of his 







antislavery position.129 In a speech at Ashland on September 5, 1860, Breckenridge argued that 
no “responsible political party” could hold the opinion that the citizens of a territory or a 
territorial legislature could exclude slave property pending territorial status.130 The Journal also 
criticized Douglas’s “squatter sovereignty” and labeled him a “northern sectionalist.”131 The 
state’s Breckenridge Democrats, the paper added, viewed Douglas’s popular sovereignty as 
“cowardly abolition[ism].”132 Kentuckians’ commitment to slavery even in non-slaveholding 
regions hurt the Douglas campaign. The Illinois Senator’s opposition to the proslavery 
Lecompton Constitution, endorsed by Breckenridge, Buchanan, and southern Democrats, further 
alienated him from the southern wing of the party.133 Though Bell too had voted against 
Lecompton, as a former Whig with primarily former Whig supporters, his vote did not hurt him 
as much because of Lecompton’s association with Democrats. Further, Bell supporters praised 
him as the only consistent opponent of popular sovereignty and the Kansas Nebraska Act in the 
race.134 
 The fact that Breckenridge, a former Kentucky congressman from Henry Clay’s Ashland 
district, was a local favorite candidate and knew the Kentucky Democratic machinery 
unquestionably hurt Douglas’s prospects in Kentucky. The Journal predicted that with 
Breckenridge’s nomination by Richmond delegates, Douglas would “cut a very slender figure 
here as in the south generally.”135 The belated walkout of the Kentucky delegates at Baltimore 











 Still, Douglas did not lack friends and supporters in the commonwealth. Kentuckian H. 
Marshall believed that Douglas could win the state after traveling throughout the Jackson 
Purchase in the western part of the state.136 Douglas received the endorsement of a major 
Democratic paper, the Louisville Democrat, and he even made a campaign stop in Louisville.137 
According to one member of the Frost Family of Lexington: 
The Lexington Democracy is split all to pieces. As soon as the news from Baltimore was 
received, the Lexington Statesman came out with the names of Breckenridge and Lane at 
the head of the columns and an editorial in their favor. [Yet] Douglas has many friends in 
this section.138 
The divided Democracy, particularly in the city of Louisville, greatly aided Bell’s cause. 
According to Bradley Bodley, “In the town [Lexington] Douglas will receive about one and a 
half or two votes to B[reckenridge]’s one, while Breck will receive five out of six votes in the 
county.”139 Bell’s victory owed much to the division within Kentucky’s Democracy. A united 
Kentucky Democracy had defeated the Oppositionist candidate, Joshua Bell, by nearly nine 
thousand votes in the 1859 gubernatorial race, placing Beriah Magoffin in office.140 Douglas 
captured 25,651 votes or 17.5 percent of the total in Kentucky. If Douglas had not garnered 
Democratic votes, Breckenridge could have defeated Bell by over ten thousand votes.141 The 
Democratic split in Kentucky aided the Bell campaign, opening the door for his comfortable 











 In the South, the Douglas campaign entertained ideas of fusion with the Constitutional 
Union campaign, following the example of fusion tickets in New York and New Jersey.142 The 
two tickets did not fuse in Kentucky, but they reached an entente cordial or friendly 
agreement.143 The pro-Douglas paper, the Louisville Democrat, attacked the Breckenridge 
campaign and its Louisville organ, the Courier, much more fiercely than it attacked the Bell 
campaign.144 The Courier referred to Bell and Douglas supporters as “compatriots” and claimed 
that Bell-Everett men made up the majority of attendees at a pro-Douglas rally in Louisville.145 
The Courier repeatedly charged that the entente cordial attacked Breckenridge with false 
allegations.146 Still, the Bell and Douglas campaigns in Kentucky sometimes clashed, as when 
the Journal noted, “Those who admire Douglas have a contempt for dignity and those who 
admire dignity have a contempt for Douglas.”147 However, as the election approached, the Bell 
and Douglas campaigns directed their ire primarily at Breckenridge. 
 The unpopularity of popular sovereignty, Breckenridge’s favorite son status, and the 
secession of the Kentucky delegation from the Baltimore convention, led the majority of the 
divided Kentucky Democratic Party to support Breckenridge who had served two terms in the 
House from 1851 to 1855, representing Henry Clay’s former Ashland district. In 1857, at age 
thirty-six, he became the youngest vice president in the nation’s history after running with James 
Buchanan.148 Breckenridge had a reputation as a friend of the slave states, but he was not seen as 











Lecompton Constitution and the congressional protection of slavery in the territories after Dred 
Scott.149  
Breckenridge lacked the reputation as a southern ultra, but he accepted the nomination of 
the Democratic faction led by radical proslavery southerners such as William Lowndes Yancey 
and Robert Barnwell Rhett. The platform Breckenridge ran on and the majority of the Kentucky 
Democracy supported reflected the politics of Yancey and advocated for protection of slavery in 
the territories:  
 The Government of a Territory is temporary. During its existence, all citizens of the 
 United States have an equal right to settle with their property in the territory….It is the  
 duty of the Federal government, in all its departments, to protect the right of persons and 
 properties in the Territory.150 
Breckenridge’s association with southern ultras, coupled with a decade of debate over slavery 
capped by John Brown’s raid on Harpers Ferry in October 1859, placed the issues of union and 
slavery at the forefront of the 1860 election. The rhetoric of Union and slavery enabled Bell to 
garner the support of Kentucky voters and win the state’s electoral votes. 
 The 1860 presidential race in Kentucky followed the pattern of slave states identified by 
historians such as E.D. Fite, Ollinger Crenshaw, and James Fuller. Breckenridge and Bell were 
the primary contenders that emerged, despite a fairly significant faction of Douglas supporters in 
the state. Notwithstanding the state’s modern fondness for Lincoln, as a candidate in 1860 he 








Party’s association with antislavery made them an object of fear and scorn among Kentucky 
Constitutional Unionists and Democrats alike. 
 In 1859, while exploring the idea of working with conservative Republicans, Crittenden 
seems to have contacted Lincoln, a former moderate Whig, about the Constitutional Union Party 
nomination for 1860.152 Crittenden and other Constitutional Unionists likewise vetted Edward 
Bates of Missouri, a former Whig who sought the Republican nomination in 1860 at Chicago.153 
Nonetheless, Constitutional Unionists in Kentucky attacked Lincoln after he accepted the 
Republican nomination over the more radical antislavery former governor of New York, William 
Seward. They assailed Lincoln and his party on charges of abolitionism and dangerous northern 
sectionalism. Just as they linked Breckenridge and disunionism, Constitutional Unionists in 
Kentucky often charged Lincoln with abolitionism through guilt by association. Republicans, 
noted Garrett Davis, had a “fanatical hatred of slavery” and Lincoln, although perhaps a 
moderate, also harbored “hostility” to the peculiar institution.154 
 The southern claim that the Republican Party intended to destroy slavery where it 
presently existed found no support in the Republican Party’s platform in 1860, and most 
Republicans vocally condemned the actions of radical abolitionist John Brown at Harpers Ferry. 
But the Republican platform endorsed a strong free-soil ideology stating, “We [the Republican 
Party] deny the authority of congress or a territorial legislature or any individual to give legal 
existence to slavery in any territory.” The party’s opposition to the extension of slavery 
convinced their opponents in Kentucky, both Constitutional Unionists and Democrats, that its 







New York Whig congressman, in what historian Allan Nevins deemed the most effective 
Constitutional Union pamphlet of the campaign, accused the Republican Party of eventual if not 
immediate abolitionism.155 
 In Kentucky, as throughout the rest of the South, all opposing parties began to use the 
“Black Republican” label. Lexington antislavery activist, politician, and printer Cassius Clay 
could not have been more wrong about Kentucky’s views towards Republicans when he wrote 
that he “[had] no fears of carrying the state in 1860.”156 Most Kentuckians’ perceived the 
Republicans as a threat, an active danger to their way of life that had to be defeated. In fact, 
Republicans served more as an object of fear than a real political force in Kentucky. The Journal 
launched criticisms at the Republicans similar to those of the pro-Breckenridge Courier: “If the 
Black Republican Candidate shall be elected to the Presidency,” the Journal declared in August 
of 1860, “he will be expected to devote his whole time to ‘rail splitting’ for the Underground 
Railroad.”157 The Journal even declared that the success or failure of the Union depended on 
whether the Republicans could be defeated.158 The Courier attempted to tar Bell with the 
Republican label and damage his credibility among Kentucky voters. In an article titled, “Black 
Republican Sentiments,” the Courier claimed that Bell was “mentioned by many Black 
Republicans in connection with the Chicago nomination.”159  
In Kentucky, Lincoln and the Republicans served as a group to be feared should they win 
election, but the party received minimal support. Douglas, as a result of the unpopularity of 









chance of carrying Kentucky. However, Douglas received 17 percent of the vote, splitting the 
Democratic vote, and enabling Bell to claim victory. The election in Kentucky came down to a 
contest between Breckenridge and Bell as it did throughout the southern states, with Douglas 
acting as a spoiler. The contest would be decided on the issues of unionism and slavery as both 
men attempted to claim the mantle of Kentucky’s great antebellum hero, Henry Clay.  
 Chapter II: The Conduct of the Campaign in Kentucky 
The Organizational Strategy of the Constitutional Union: 
Prominent politicians such as Crittenden, Washington Hunt, William Graham, John P. Kennedy, 
Bell, and Everett organized the Constitutional Union Party from the top down. They revived old 
conservative Whig politics and merged it with southern American Party men and border state 
“Oppositionists.” After issuing a call for true Union men to organize and appoint delegates, they 
nominated Bell and Everett at their Baltimore convention on the platform of the Union, the 
Constitution, and the Laws. However, the party required an overall national as well as state-level 
strategy and organization to succeed at subverting sectionalism and maintaining the Union. 
 From the outset, many national leaders of the Constitutional Union Party deemed outright 
victory unlikely. Instead, party leaders hoped to deny Lincoln a majority of the electoral college 
and send the election to the House of Representatives according to the process set forth in the 
twelfth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.160 If they could send the election to the House, a 
likely outcome given a divided Democratic Party and the virtual guarantee that no slave state 
would vote for Lincoln, Bell might win election as a compromise candidate, the second choice of 





House.161 In pursuit of this strategy, the Constitutional Union actively pursued fusion in certain 
states with the only other truly national candidate, Douglas. The Constitutional Union and 
National Democrats actively pursued fusion in New York and New Jersey in a largely failed 
effort to swing the states for Douglas and deny Lincoln an electoral college majority.162 Though 
the two campaigns did not fuse in the border states of Kentucky or Virginia, they did enter into 
an informal agreement to direct the majority of their ire at Breckenridge.163 
 The national strategy did not always mirror state level rhetoric or the expectations of 
many Constitutional Union voters. To excite voter enthusiasm and ensure a large turnout, 
politicians argued that Bell could win a majority of the electoral college outright or at least carry 
a large number of states in an effort to send the election to House. The Journal proclaimed that it 
had reliable information that Bell would carry states like Missouri and Alabama.164 Writing to 
Kentucky, a Constitutional Union operative dared to hope Bell might be elected outright by the 
voters.165 Blanton Duncan, a Constitutional Union elector from Kentucky in 1860, did not seem 
to believe that Bell could win election by the people. However, he thought that Bell would win a 
good many states, certainly more than he did. Duncan declared, “Bell is certain to carry Virginia 
and North Carolina as well as Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware and Tennessee.” He added that “in 
Mississippi the probability is decidedly for Bell.”166 Duncan even doubted whether Breckenridge 











Bell would win many states, perhaps enough to win outright. In the event that he did not, they 
hoped fusion with Douglas would send the election to the House where Bell would be elected. 
 The Constitutional Union Party had several organizational advantages in Kentucky, 
especially the support of key state political leaders. Crittenden, in effect the national chairman of 
the party, had a long career in Whig politics, beginning in the state legislature, representing 
Kentucky in the United Senate, and occupying the governor’s office in Frankfort. Davis, a 
former Whig congressman and American Party leader, also played an important role in the 
national organization of the Constitutional Union Party. Likewise, the party enjoyed the support 
of former Whig congressman and former Know-Nothing Governor Morehead. The support of 
these prominent politicians gave the Constitutional Union Party a large electoral base of former 
Whigs and American Party members along with their political connections. In addition, the 
Constitutional Union Party enjoyed the support of Kentucky Opposition newspapers, led by 
George D. Prentice’s Louisville Journal, to disseminate the party’s message. 
 Nonetheless, the “new” party appears to have encountered some initial organizational 
problems. On July 20, the Journal implored its readers to organize as “local parties have yet to 
be formed” in most counties.168 Similarly, on July 4, the Journal asked the state committee of the 
party to better “organize its supporters around the commonwealth.” 169 Still, the Constitutional 
Union began to campaign for Bell and functioned as a typical antebellum political party. On July 
11, Constitutional Union partisans held a large ratification demonstration in Louisville to support 
the nomination of Bell and Everett.170 Recognizing the political similarities of Kentucky and 







shared border to celebrate their ticket.171 County and local branches of the party also planned 
festivals and barbeques in support of Bell. The “Union Men of Trigg, Lyon and Caldwell 
Counties” held a “Grand Union Festival” at Robert Palmer’s springs on October 5.172 A mass 
Constitutional Union meeting took place at Mount Sterling on the same day.173 Local supporters, 
headed by Constitutional Union electors, led the canvass in large portions of the state. W.M. 
Fulkerson, a Bell elector, canvassed Jackson, Rockcastle, and Laurel Counties. Other electors 
and “assistant electors” stumped for Bell in Wolfe, Morgan, Magoffin, Bath, Rowen, Carter, 
Mason, Fleming, and Lewis Counties as well as in the city of Ashland.174 Electors and others 
conducted nearly a complete canvass of the state. 
Party leaders traveled the state making public speeches on behalf of Bell and garnered 
much attention. Crittenden delivered the most important Constitutional Union speech of the 
campaign on August 2 to a packed audience at Mozart Hall in Louisville.175 Crittenden served as 
the most important spokesman for Bell in the state as the campaign continued. Morehead also 
campaigned on behalf of Bell and even took the Constitutional Union message to an Indiana 
demonstration.176 Kentucky Constitutional Unionists took an interest in the Indiana election, 
hoping to sway the state for Bell or Douglas by appealing to conservative Republicans.177 In 
accordance with antebellum tradition, Bell did not actively campaign, relying instead on his 
electors, local partisans, and prominent men such as Crittenden and Morehead to speak for him 











 In addition to demonstrations, barbeques, and speeches, written campaign materials 
served an important function in the party’s campaign strategy. The Louisville Journal served as a 
campaign newspaper throughout the state. Following antebellum tradition, the paper served as an 
attack dog for Constitutional Unionists, frequently targeting Breckenridge and his “disunionist” 
friends and criticizing “Black Republicans.” The Journal touted Bell’s experience, emphasized 
unionism, and defended the candidate’s proslavery record. It encouraged its readers around the 
state to increase the circulation of the paper and distribute it throughout their communities.178 
They offered to mail copies to “Union Clubs” for twelve and a half cents per month if the club 
had five or more members, and for sixteen cents per month if less than five, for the duration of 
the campaign.179 The Journal’s importance did not end at Kentucky’s borders. It proved one of 
the most widely circulated papers in the slave states and “in no part of the country did anyone 
assume a stauncher unionist attitude.”180 Another important campaign document of Kentucky 
Constitutional Unionists came in the form of John J. Crittenden’s speech in Louisville titled “The 
Constitution, the Union, and the Laws.” The Journal reproduced the speech and Prentice had it 
printed in pamphlet form and distributed to voters.181 Citizens of Louisville hung Constitutional 
Union flags and banners outside their homes. Constitutional Union supporters began using 
letterheads bearing a drawing of Bell along with envelopes with bells and the slogan “both bells 
have turned.”182 Other letterheads included the names of Bell electors in the commonwealth.183 










materials produced by the national committee, including Bell and Everett campaign biographies, 
promotional fliers, and a letter addressed to the “People of the United States.” 
 The Constitutional Union Party in Kentucky ran state level candidates in addition to the 
presidential ticket. For example, Leslie Combs ran in a statewide race for the clerk of the court of 
appeals on the Constitutional Union ticket. It also nominated some local candidates for offices 
such as sheriff. H. Bodley wrote to his brother about his nomination for sheriff by the 
Constitutional Union Party at a state convention.184 Leslie Combs, a former Whig politician and 
military general, defeated Breckenridge Democrat Clinton McClarty by 68,165 to 44,942 votes 
in the August race for clerk of the Kentucky court of appeals.185 The state level races served as 
an early indication of the strength of Constitutional Union support in Kentucky and the weakness 
of the divided Kentucky Democracy. 
Unionism: The Primary Campaign Issue 
As one traveler observed while visiting Kentucky in 1860, Kentuckians primarily discussed 
unionism and disunionism in connection with the 1860 election.186 The Bell campaign’s primary 
tactic was to associate Breckenridge with disunionism and the southern sectionalist conspiracy to 
break up the Union, while portraying themselves as ardent defenders of the Union. This tactic 
proved extremely effective and contributed enormously to Bell’s electoral victory in the state. 
Kentuckians’ antebellum political culture celebrated deep attachment to the Union.187 Its greatest 
political hero was Henry Clay, the Great Compromiser. Clay earned a reputation for promoting 








championed the Missouri Compromise to settle sectional strife over slavery. His last great public 
act, the Compromise of 1850, shared the same national spirit. Some Kentuckians feared the 
radicalism of southern Democrats. According to Joseph Patterson, southern Democrats would 
rise to defend their “southern rights [slavery]” as they were “better fitted by nature to figure in 
the Fields of Mars than in the country of Cupid.”188  
However, the Union did not serve merely as a sentimental positive for Kentuckians. The 
Union also promoted a whole host of practical benefits. Kentucky had deep economic ties to both 
the North and the South. With expanding railroads and the Ohio River connection to the 
Mississippi, Kentucky served as a crossroads of North-South commerce.189 Kentucky farmers 
sent hemp, their primary cash crop, along with slaves and northern manufactured goods south 
while they sent tobacco north by rail and canal.190 In the 1850s, more than nine out of ten 
Kentuckians worked on farms and relied on both northern and southern markets to absorb their 
surplus crop.191 Kentuckians feared a North-South split would greatly damage the state’s 
economy. Moreover, as residents of a border state, Kentuckians feared that any conflict would 
pose great human costs and borders turned into battlegrounds. The pro-Union sentiments greatly 
benefited the Bell campaign as Constitutional Unionists exploited the relationship of their 
southern Democratic opponent, Breckenridge, with radical southerners such as like Yancey and 
Rhett. 
Possibly the most damning political moment for the Breckenridge campaign was 








took to the podium and began by praising Bell and the Constitutional Union as “moderate, calm, 
and patriotic.”192 He emphasized the party’s attachment to the Union and its fight against 
sectionalism that threatened the Union, both the northern variety embodied by Republicans and 
the southern version embodied by southern Democrats. But the respected Kentucky statesman’s 
scathing critique of Breckenridge served as the climax of the speech. Crittenden declared that, 
“There is not a disunionist South of the Mason-Dixon Line that does not support that party 
[Southern Democratic]….that does not support that candidate [Breckenridge].”193 Crittenden 
concluded that while Breckenridge himself may not be a disunionist, at least his associates were, 
and that represented danger enough to warrant the support of Bell. 
These accusations from Crittenden and similar remarks from other Kentuckians 
represented a grave threat to the Breckenridge campaign. The potential for damage was so great 
that Breckenridge broke with antebellum political tradition and like Douglas took to the stump to 
speak in favor of his candidacy. The story wrote itself for the Journal which called the event a 
“disgraceful spectacle of a candidate for president on the stump.”194The fact that Breckenridge 
spoke out personally to combat charges of disunion demonstrates both the gravity of the 
accusations, and the fact that they worked. Breckenridge took to the stump at a barbeque near 
Ashland held by James B. Clay, the grandson of Henry Clay, on September 5, 1860. Assuredly, 
the location and host were designed to convey his respect for both Henry Clay and the Union. 
Breckenridge argued that southern Democrats supported the Constitution, the Union, and sought 
to protect Americans’ constitutional right to bring their slaves property into U.S. territories. 







position and required Congress to protect slaveholders’ property rights throughout the entire 
U.S.195 He professed to support the Constitution and the Union and challenged that “The man 
does not live in or out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky…who has power enough to connect 
my name with the slightest taint of disunion.”196 Despite his personal speech, Breckenridge could 
not escape the allegations of disunion running rampant among his associates and party. 
The continued allegations offered by Kentucky Constitutional Unionists and their 
newspapers did not allow Breckenridge to escape the taint of disunion. On June 20, the Journal, 
in an article titled “The Conspiracy Against the Union,” stated that “the Union is profoundly 
endangered by the Southern Democrats.”197 On July 25, a public letter by Garrett Davis referred 
to Breckenridge supporters as “avowed disunionists.”198 On August 15, the paper announced that 
“The Breckenridge Party is to all intents and purposes a disunion party. It was got up by 
Disunionists for Disunion purposes and other disunionists are joining it from time to time for 
disunion purposes.”199 On September 5, the paper ran a headline reading, “Breckenridge and 
Disunion.” The same day, the paper acknowledged that Breckenridge may not be disunionist, but 
stressed that “almost the solid body of his supporters are.”200 The attacks upon Breckenridge and 
his associates as disunionists continued unceasingly throughout the campaign. 
A key tactic of Kentucky Constitutional Unionists was to associate Breckenridge with 
known disunionists such as William Lowndes Yancey rather than throw accusations at him 










abolitionists were to Kentuckians. Association rather than indirect attacks allowed Kentucky 
Constitutional Unionists to score political points while maintaining that they respected the 
Kentucky favorite. On August 8, a headline reading, “The Disunion Ticket” listed the name of 
Yancey for president alongside Breckenridge.201 On August 15, the Journal referred to the 
Democratic faction as “Yancey-Breckenridge-ism.”202 Constitutional Unionists’ contempt for 
Yancey shone brightest in the August 15 edition of the Journal which stated that “Mr. Yancey 
fancies himself ‘looking down upon the friends of Bell and Everett.’ He will never be able to 
look down on them unless they attend his hanging.”203 The paper’s efforts to associate 
Breckenridge with Yancey, a well-known and open disunionist, did irreparable damage to the 
Breckenridge campaign and led many Kentuckians into the Bell or Douglas camps.  
Breckenridge supporters fully realized the danger the accusations of disunionism posed in 
Kentucky, and they tried to direct them back at their opponents. In an article entitled, “Beware of 
Disunion,” the Courier accused Douglas of disunion on the grounds of his alleged subversion of 
the fugitive slave laws.204 On September 22, the Courier accused Bell and Everett supporters in 
Alabama of “rampant secessionism” and asserted that a Bell elector in Florida was an open 
disunionist.205 James B. Clay, the grandson of Henry Clay, stumped for Breckenridge likely in an 
effort to associate him with the great unionist.206 Yancey even appeared at a speaking 
engagement at the Louisville Courthouse in order to soften the image of his faction of the party. 










portrayed the Republicans as the greatest threat to slavery and the union, but could not resist a 
dig at Bell that his party, “says nothing….proposes nothing.”207 
The Breckenridge campaign efforts to convince voters of their Unionism fell short. It did 
not help that Breckenridge refused to answer questions regarding his statements about states’ 
right to secession. During a campaign stop in Norfolk, Virginia, Douglas challenged 
Breckenridge to answer whether states had the right to secede and whether the government ought 
to use force to keep the Union together.208 It appears that Breckenridge refused to answer the 
secession question directly. In response the Courier turned the attack on the Constitutional Union 
campaign asking Bell to answer questions more directly.209 The Courier did Breckenridge no 
favors on September 22 when they ran an article titled, “The Right of Revolution,” which 
criticized Douglas for denying the right of secession.210 The accusations, based on comments 
such as these, Breckenridge’s association with avowed secession supporters like Yancey, and 
Breckenridge’s past pronouncements on secession, tied Breckenridge to secession politics and 
damaged his reputation amongst many Kentucky voters. 
The rhetoric of the Constitutional Union did not simply tie Breckenridge to disunion, but 
it also emphasized Bell’s pro-Union credentials. The party’s motto, taken from Henry Clay 
himself, celebrated, “The Union, the Constitution, and the Laws.”211 The campaign biography, 
distributed to voters, included a full copy of the United States Constitution.212 The party’s banner 










and their Platform.” Across the top of this banner, a bald eagle held in its talons the message, 
“No North, no South, no East, no West, nothing but the Union.”213 A handbill distributed to 
voters in Kentucky urged them to “Remember our state motto: United we stand divided we Fall.” 
The same handbill reprinted George Washington’s farewell address warning against partisan 
strife.214 The symbolism of the party’s campaign messages tied Bell to the cause of national 
unity. Invoking Kentucky’s state motto and the words of its famous statesman Clay, tied Bell and 
Kentucky to the quest for consensus and Union. The Journal hammered home Bell’s pro-Union 
message, consistently referring to him as a patriot, a national candidate, and an ardent unionist. 
The Constitutional Union Party’s attacks on the disunionism of Breckenridge’s southern 
Democrats had the desired effect. Kentuckians believed that the Union served as a positive good 
for both political culture and practical reasons, and they granted Bell, the most pro-Union 
candidate, the state’s electoral votes. The rhetoric of Union and national reconciliation carried 
the day in Kentucky, as Bell defeated Breckenridge by over thirteen thousand votes. But 
Unionism in Kentucky was also tied to slavery. Therefore, the Constitutional Union message in 
1860 also emphasized Bell’s proslavery credentials. 
Slavery: The (Other) Primary Issue 
The issue of African slavery and the future of the institution in the United States lay at the heart 
of the 1860 election and the Civil War that followed. The four parties and candidates took 
different stances on the issue of slavery and its extension. Lincoln and the Republicans opposed 
the extension of slavery into both new and existing U.S. territories. Northern Democrats 






Breckenridge Democrats embraced the Dred Scott decision of the Taney court and supported the 
congressional protection of slavery and its extension into all U.S. territories. The Constitutional 
Union platform did not enunciate a clear position on slavery and called instead for an end to the 
discussion of slavery at the national level as it only bred sectionalism and unnecessary conflict. 
In Kentucky, the Constitutional Union Party sought to assure voters that they were as capable as 
Breckenridge Democrats of protecting the institution of slavery. 
The positions of Douglas and Lincoln on slavery effectively disqualified them from 
serious contention in Kentucky. Both the Breckenridge and Bell campaigns in Kentucky attacked 
Douglas’s position on “squatter sovereignty” and decried Republicans as northern agitators at 
best and abolitionists at worst. On the subject of slavery in Kentucky in 1860, the contest became 
a fight for ground between the Breckenridge and Bell campaigns over who was more proslavery. 
The Breckenridge Democrats portrayed Bell as lukewarm on slavery pointing to his vote on 
Lecompton, his party’s failure to take a strong proslavery stand, and his northern running mate 
Everett. Kentucky Constitutional Unionists answered these criticisms by emphasizing Bell’s 
statements in the Senate on slavery, his status as a slaveholder, and his record as a prudent and 
reasonable defender of the peculiar institution. They also criticized Breckenridge, alleging that 
he had supported popular sovereignty or even anti-extension measures in the past. The 1860 
election in Kentucky followed the pattern of antebellum southern elections described by historian 
William Cooper in The South and the Politics of Slavery. Both parties attempted to portray 







Though Crittenden, the party’s most prominent Kentuckian, may have viewed slavery as 
“a great evil” and supported colonization efforts, the rhetoric of the Constitutional Union Party in 
Kentucky took a distinctly proslavery bent as the election approached.216 The proslavery rhetoric 
began mildly enough. On June 6, the Journal stated that Bell would support “the legal rights of 
the South.”217 On July 25, they printed a letter from Garrett Davis, criticizing Douglas for 
promoting “squatter sovereignty” in the free states.218 In a printed reply to an Alabama 
constituent, Bell declined to enunciate a specific position on the extension of slavery, stating that 
the correspondent ought to “examine his public record.”219 Bell’s answer emphasized his 
moderate national course while remaining a reliable protector of slavery where it existed and in 
new regions where he believed it could expand. The national party in their letter “To the People 
of the United States” accurately characterized Bell and the party’s position on slavery, noting 
that the expansion question would be settled by climate and soil of the territory.220  
However, such mild statements endorsing southern legal rights proved inadequate, and 
the Journal soon began to portray Bell as a politician who favored slavery’s extension and 
viewed the institution as a “positive good.” In response to attacks from the Courier, the Journal 
stated that “John Bell, in both the House of Representatives and the Senate…defended the 
institution of slavery in all its moral, social, and political aspects.221 On August 22, they printed 










a moral and economic positive for the nation. After stating that Africans come as “savages” on 
the Senate floor, Bell stated, 
What do we now behold? These few thousand slaves have become a great people, 
numbering three millions, civilized, Christianized, with each generation developing some 
improved feature, -- Physical and Mental indicating much further approximation now to 
the race of their masters...I doubt whether the power and resources of the country would 
have attained more than one half of their present, extraordinary proportions but for the so 
much reviled institution of African slavery.222 
On the constitutionality of the extension of slavery to the territories, the paper also 
included a lengthy quotation by Bell: 
 The Constitution, in its application to this territory [Kansas] is expected not merely to 
 protect property in slaves as is the case in Oregon, before there was any exercise of  
 sovereignty upon the subject, but to supersede local laws prohibiting slavery when the  
 United States came into possession of it.223 
Another lengthy defense of Bell’s record on slavery came on September 22: 
 Of all the empty objections raised against John Bell in the South, the objection that  
 he is unsound on the slavery question is the most absurdly empty…John Bell is the only 
 candidate who as always voted directly against the Wilmot Proviso and squatter   






 Bell is the only candidate who has declared that humanity to the slave no less justice to
 the master, requires the diffusion and expansion of slavery.224    
The paper also praised Bell for voting in favor of an amendment that protected slavery in 
territories gained during the Mexican-American War.225 
 In addition, the Journal highlighted Bell’s personal status as a slave owner and directed 
criticism at Breckenridge. “The Charges of abolitionism against Bell and Everett are almost 
universally made by men who own no niggers and who are quite as little fit to own niggers as 
they are to be owned by them.”226 Contrasting Bell’s ownership of slaves to Breckenridge’s was 
intended to send a clear message that Bell was more reliable on the subject of slavery than 
Breckenridge. The Journal clearly engaged in what Cooper calls the politics of slavery: “Let a 
man recognize distinctly that John Bell is as in favor of intervention as unequivocally as John C. 
Breckenridge.”227 The same day, the paper claimed that abolitionist Cassius Clay supported 
Breckenridge as he purportedly did not own slaves.228 Constitutional Unionists in Kentucky 
likewise criticized Breckenridge for his alleged support of popular sovereignty during the 1856 
presidential campaign and even claimed that he supported the Wilmot Proviso in 1848.229 
 The Breckenridge faction of the Democratic Party had the strongest proslavery platform 














regularly attacked the Constitutional Union and Bell as weak on slavery. The Courier referred to 
Bell and his “northern supporters” as abolitionists.230 Similarly, they tried to connect Bell to the 
Republican nomination at the Chicago convention.231 They called into question Bell’s 1850s 
voting record on slavery, citing his vote against the Kansas-Nebraska Act as well as the 
Lecompton Constitution.232 The Journal responded that while Bell voted against the proslavery 
constitution for Kansas, he did vote for the amendment proposed by Crittenden to admit Kansas 
as a slave state if a majority voted for slavery in a fair election.233 For Breckenridge Democrats, 
attacking Everett, a Massachusetts politician and obviously not proslavery in the southern sense, 
also served as a viable strategy. The criticism arose so early and often that it forced Everett to 
respond publicly in a letter to accusations he harbored antislavery views. Everett reiterated his 
support for the 1850 compromise, and stated that his views on slavery accorded with those of 
Henry Clay.234 
 On the slavery question, the Constitutional Union left its platform intentionally vague. 
The party did not try to be all things to all people, but rather its leaders believed that the slavery 
debate had gone too far. If it continued, they feared the Union would split along sectional lines. 
Ultimately, Bell was a conservative pragmatist who remained committed to slavery’s protection. 
He supported the institution of slavery in areas where it already existed, and he believed that the 
extension of slavery depended solely on whether the soil and climate of a territory could support 
the institution. He did not believe Kansas or Nebraska could support slavery, so he declined to 









Bell thought that slaveholders ought to pick their battles and, for their own good and the good of 
the Union, not overreach. He concluded that agitation over slavery served only to endanger the 
peculiar institution.235 
 Many white Kentuckians appreciated Bell’s moderation on and support for slavery. His 
votes against Kansas-Nebraska and the Lecompton Constitution demonstrated his willingness to 
place the national interest ahead of sectional concerns. However, his status as a slave owner and 
his votes for the protection and, under the right circumstances, extension of slavery assured them 
that he would also safeguard the institution in Kentucky. The heightened rhetoric concerning 
slavery during the 1860 election demonstrated Kentuckians’ firm attachment to the institution 
where it existed and their openness to its expansion. The fight over the high ground on 
proslavery issues raises serious questions about whether white Kentuckians saw slavery as a 
necessary evil. The slavery debate in 1860 revealed that they sought a candidate who was 
sufficiently proslavery. Constitutional Unionists succeeded in convincing Kentuckians that Bell 
could be trusted to protect the peculiar institution in the state. As the candidate best able to 
protect the Union and sound on the issue of slavery, Bell overcame Breckenridge and carried the 
state of Kentucky in 1860. 
The Fight over Henry Clay’s Legacy 
The 1860 campaign also revealed the importance of Henry Clay’s persisting importance in 
Kentucky politics. Bell and Breckenridge supporters argued over whose candidate best served as 
the inheritor of Clay’s legacy. The Breckenridge campaign stirred up a controversy, hoping that 





 Early in the campaign, Constitutional Unionists staked their claim to Clay’s legacy. On 
June 27, the Journal urged Kentuckians to uphold the mantra of Clay, “The Union, the 
Constitution, and the Laws,” by supporting the Bell-Everett ticket.236 Most former Whig 
politicians and their supporters joined the Constitutional Union Party to save the union from 
sectional conflict, the primary goal of Clay’s political career. However, Clay’s political 
inheritance was more complicated than it seemed at first. In the 1848 election, after Crittenden 
failed to endorse Clay’s nomination bid, the two statesmen had a falling out and Kentucky Whigs 
split into two factions.237 Crittenden tried to heal the division, but Clay’s hard feelings persisted, 
and the Clay faction denied Crittenden a Senate seat in the early 1850s, instead supporting 
Archibald Dixon.238 The divide left a mark on Kentucky Whiggery and Crittenden’s career. Bell 
too had not always supported Clay’s politics. He believed, for example, that while Congress had 
the power and ought to distribute funds for internal improvements, it could not oversee the actual 
projects as Clay proposed.239 
 Breckenridge Democrats attempted to drive a wedge between Bell and Clay’s legacy by 
drudging up the “corrupt bargain” when a young Bell had still been a Jacksonian. In the 1824 
election, a four-way contest between Andrew Jackson, Clay, John Quincy Adams, and William 
Crawford, no candidate received a majority in the electoral college, forcing the House to decide 
between Jackson, Adams, and Clay. As speaker of the House, Clay threw his support behind 








Once president, Adams named Clay his Secretary of State, and allegations abounded that Clay 
supported Adams and denied the will of the people, in exchange for the cabinet position. 
 Breckenridge Democrats revived this thirty-six-year old controversy in order to tarnish 
Bell and claim the mantle of Clay. On August 6, the Courier, stated that in 1824 Bell had 
questioned Clay’s honor and added his name to the list of individuals who decried the corrupt 
bargain.240 They believed that Bell had unjustly attacked Clay, “whose memory is dear to all 
Kentuckians,” and made himself undeserving of the Great Compromiser’s legacy.241 In a speech 
at Bardstown, James B. Clay, grandson of Henry Clay, made similar accusations against Bell.242 
The Journal retorted that the events discussed had transpired over thirty years prior, while Bell 
was still a Jacksonian. The two men worked together within the same party for thirty years, and 
“nobody ever heard Henry Clay speak of John Bell except in terms of high respect and 
regard.”243 Nonetheless, the Democrats continued to push the issue and used Clay’s grandson on 
the stump in a bid for the Great Compromiser’s legacy. The Journal responded with columns 
such as “Henry Clay’s Opinion of John Bell,” which described an instance in which Clay praised 
Bell for “firmness and integrity.”244 
 At the polls, Breckenridge Democrats’ bid for Clay’s mantle fell short. Bell’s electoral 
success in Kentucky Whig strongholds that had also supported Clay demonstrated that voters 
viewed Bell’s message of union, moderation, and compromise as part of Clay’s political legacy. 









Chapter III: Analysis of the Results and Border State Comparison 
Results in Kentucky 
John Bell carried the state with 66,058 votes and 45.18 percent of the statewide count. 
Breckenridge ran second with 53,143 votes and 36.35 percent of the vote, while Douglas ran 
third with 25,638 votes and 17.5 percent of the vote.245 Lincoln received less than 1 percent of 
the statewide count amounting to 1,364 votes.246 In the election of 1860, 67 percent of eligible 
white male Kentuckians voted, less than a point below the nationwide average.247 The statewide 
electoral count illuminates the influence of partisan loyalty and past voting behavior, Douglas’s 
denial of votes to Breckenridge in key counties, and the success of the Constitutional Union’s 
proslavery message in gaining the support of voters in large slaveholding regions. 
 The continuity of voting along Whig and Democratic Party lines becomes evident in the 
county-by-county vote totals. Most traditional Whig strongholds gave Bell a majority of their 
vote. For example, the largest Whig strongholds such as Jefferson County (Louisville) gave Bell 
4,896 votes to Breckenridge’s 1,122 and Douglas’s 3,341. Fayette County (Lexington, inner 
Bluegrass) behaved in a similar manner with Bell receiving 1,411 votes to Breckenridge’s 1,051 
and Douglas’s 99.248  Bell won a majority in five other counties in Kentucky’s inner Bluegrass, 
including the traditional Whig strongholds of Bourbon, Clark, Jessamine, Woodford, and 










bastions.250This demonstrates an obvious correlation between Whig and Constitutional Union 
voters despite the collapse of the Whig Party six years earlier. The continuity of Whig identity 
and partisan support helps explain Bell’s plurality. However, Bell did not carry all traditional 
Whig strongholds as Breckenridge enjoyed a majority of the Franklin County (Frankfort) vote.251 
As Bell generally ran well in formerly Whig counties, so too did Breckenridge run well in 
traditional Democratic areas. Breckenridge carried majorities in many counties in the Jackson 
Purchase, the far western region of the state, and the Appalachian region in the far east, both 
traditional areas of Democratic power.252 
 In addition to his success in former Whig strongholds, Bell’s plurality resulted partially 
from Democratic votes Douglas denied Breckenridge in key areas. Without the Democratic votes 
garnered by Douglas, Bell may well have been defeated by Breckenridge. Douglas took a large 
number of votes from Breckenridge in counties as far west as Warren County (Bowling Green) 
where he earned 615 to Breckenridge’s 182.253 Douglas even carried Larue County in the eastern 
Pennyroyal region (central Kentucky), earning 450 votes while Breckenridge took only 32.254 
Douglas ran strongest in the Marion, Washington, Taylor, Nelson, and Hart County area carrying 
all of these traditionally Democratic areas and denying them to Breckenridge.255 A large chunk 
of Douglas votes inhibited Breckenridge from gaining a key slice of the urban vote in Louisville 
and northern Kentucky. Douglas earned 2,500 votes in northern Kentucky across the river from 











The twenty five thousand votes earned by Douglas represented a split in the Democratic Party 
and opened the door for Bell to win Kentucky with a plurality of votes.  
 In general, Breckenridge, the most proslavery candidate, did not run well in counties with 
the largest amount of slaves. What does this reveal about the rhetoric of the campaign? It seems 
to substantiate the fact that the Constitutional Union’s proslavery message in Kentucky worked, 
at least enough to convince many slaveholders that their property was safe under a Bell 
administration. Henderson County, in the western part of the state, had a population of 712 slave 
owners and 5,767 slaves. Bell received nearly four hundred more votes than Breckenridge. 
Logan County, in the western Pennyroyal region, featured over six thousand slaves and one 
thousand slaveholders, and Bell defeated Breckenridge by over 1,000 votes. Similarly, in Barren 
County in the eastern Pennyroyal region, with 689 slave owners and 4,078 slaves, Bell received 
roughly eight hundred more votes than Breckenridge. The inner Bluegrass region, around 
Lexington, featured the largest and most established plantations in the state along with the state’s 
largest slave market. The seven counties in the inner Bluegrass region, held 42,849 slaves and 
5,764 slaveholders. Bell carried six of the seven and received over 1,000 more votes than 
Breckenridge.257 While Bell achieved electoral success in large slaveholding areas, Breckenridge 
carried the region where the institution was growing fastest within the commonwealth, the far-
western Jackson Purchase area.258 However, when the dust settled, Breckenridge carried only 
one (Scott County) of the Commonwealth’s twenty largest slave counties, and Bell carried 
seventeen. Similarly, Breckenridge managed to carry just three of the top twenty counties in 







 Bell’s electoral success in regions with large numbers of slaves and slave owners seems 
to indicate that many Kentuckians with the strongest attachment to the peculiar institution 
believed that Bell and the Constitutional Union would protect the institution of slavery. Many 
Kentuckians attached this desire to protect the institution of slavery to the Union, believing that 
peace and stability afforded by the Union would protect slavery in Kentucky. This duality of 
slavery and Union in Kentucky politics gave Bell and the Constitutional Union Party the proper 
rhetorical foundation needed to woo Kentucky voters. Bell offered white Kentuckians a chance 
to maintain the Union and the institution of slavery. Rather than seeing these interests as 
contradictory, a plurality of Kentuckians saw them as complementary and the Constitutional 
Union Party as the best source for their security.  
 Bell benefited from the support of many former Whigs and the continuing strength of the 
Whig Party legacy in Kentucky. Former Whig strongholds provided Bell with his most reliable 
base of support. The division of the Democratic Party and the roughly twenty-five thousand 
votes earned by Douglas served to open the door and tip the scales in favor of a Bell victory in 
Kentucky. The Constitutional Union campaign message of strong pro-Union values, the 
accusations of disunion against Breckenridge, and the ability of Kentucky Constitutional 
Unionists to portray Bell as ready and able to protect the institution of slavery sealed his victory. 
The party’s message reflected the attitudes of Kentucky voters and ensured Breckenridge’s 
defeat. Bell gained a large plurality of Kentucky’s vote, over 45 percent, and garnered the 
commonwealth’s twelve electoral votes. 
Border State Comparison: Virginia 
Overall, John Bell won only thirty-nine electoral votes, adding fifteen from Virginia and twelve 
from his native Tennessee to the twelve from Kentucky. He also ran well in Maryland, Missouri, 
63 
 
and North Carolina. These results demonstrate the success of the Constitutional Union Party’s 
message in the Upper/Border South during the 1860 election. A brief overview of Bell’s 
campaign in another Border State, Virginia, reveals that the factors that enabled Bell to win in 
Kentucky shaped his success across the Upper/Border South. In 1860, Bell narrowly carried 
Virginia with 74,481 votes (44.63 percent) to Breckenridge’s 74,325 (44.54 percent,) and 
Douglas’s 16,198 (9.71 percent), Lincoln’s 1,887 (1.13 percent).260 
 Bell’s victory in Kentucky depended on the support of former Whig voters clustered in 
specific geographic regions and prominent former Whig politicians from the state. The collapse 
of the Whig Party sent its Kentucky supporters to the American Party and then to the 
“Opposition.”. In Virginia, this same movement of voters can be observed. In the Old Dominion, 
Bell ran best in former urban Whig strongholds such as Richmond and Norfolk and the 
slaveholding Tidewater.261 This mirrored Bell’s success in the urban areas of Louisville and 
Lexington and the established slaveholding inner Bluegrass Region. The same general Whig to 
Know-Nothing to Opposition to Constitutional Union transition took place in Virginia as the 
American Party dominated urban Whig areas of Richmond and Norfolk in the mid-1850s.262 
After the collapse of the American Party, the Opposition arose to fill the void in Whig 
strongholds in 1859.263 As in Kentucky, former Whig politicians such as John Minor Botts, 
William Goggins, and William Cabell Rives led the Constitutional Union effort.264 The 










 The split in the Democratic Party and the defection of some state Democratic voters from 
Breckenridge to Douglas provided the second ingredient for Bell’s victory in Kentucky. Douglas 
peeled away key votes from Breckenridge’s Democratic base, especially in urban areas such as 
Louisville and northern Kentucky. In Virginia, Douglas polled roughly sixteen thousand votes. If 
any significant number of these had gone for Breckenridge, Bell’s one hundred and fifty vote 
victory in Virginia would have dissolved. The defection to Douglas of many voters in the city of 
Richmond and towns in the northwest of the state enabled the Constitutional Union to carry 
Virginia in 1860.265 As in Kentucky, a Democratic vote divided between Breckenridge and 
Douglas opened the door for a Bell victory. 
 In order to secure victory and gain the support of Kentucky voters, the Constitutional 
Union’s campaign focused on a pro-Union message along with assurances that the party would 
protect the institution of slavery at least as well as Breckenridge Democrats. The Virginia 
Constitutional Union Party broadcasted a similar message. In 1859, the Opposition (later 
Constitutional Unionist) platform stated that the “safest guarantee of liberty of the people and the 
safest support of their peace and prosperity” was the Union.266 The Virginia Constitutional Union 
Party delegates to the national convention pledged to support no limitations on the institution of 
slavery.267 As in Kentucky, Virginia Democrats attempted to label the Constitutional Union Party 
antislavery, while Constitutional Union papers like the Richmond Whig advocated their support 
of the institution. The Whig went so far as to advocate the re-opening of the African slave 








Kentucky, the “Union loving conservative people of the good old commonwealth had 
triumphed.”269 
 An analysis of the 1860 election demonstrates that the Constitutional Union Party 
followed a similar path to success in both Kentucky and Virginia and likely throughout the 
Upper South where they gained substantial support. In both Kentucky and Virginia, the 
Constitutional Union organized a base among former Whig voters, benefited from Douglas 
Democratic votes, and employed proslavery and pro-Union rhetoric to sway a plurality of voters. 
These ingredients brought electoral victory to John Bell and the Constitutional Union in 
Kentucky in the presidential election of 1860.  
Regional Breakdown: 270 
Kentucky Region Bell  Breckenridge  Douglas  Lincoln  
Jackson Purchase 2,885 4,547 1,089 10 
Western Coalfield 6,561 4,174 3,453 36 
Western Pennyroyal 8,808 4,392 2,927 35 
Eastern Pennyroyal 9,007 4,613 5,148 113 
Southern Bluegrass 4,180 2,802 2,648 31 
Greater Louisville 7,229 2,205 4,677 110 
Inner Bluegrass (Lex) 6,344 5,393 341 97 
Northern Kentucky 
/Greater Cincinnati 
4,880 3,845 2,877 584 






Northeast Appalachia 3,298 4,603 490 54 
Southeast Appalachia 3,891 5,159 262 258 
 
Table 2 Kentucky Election Results:271  
Candidate  Popular Vote  Percentage 
Bell  66,058 45.18 
Breckenridge 53,143 36.35 
Douglas  25,651 17.54 
Lincoln  1,364 0.93 
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